



FULL TEACHING PORTFOLIO

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INDEX:	page
A) Courses overview	2
B) Teaching philosophy.....	3
C) Teaching evaluation surveys.....	5
D) Sillaby	
D1) Syllabus Winter 2009/10.....	6
D2) Syllabus Summer 2010.....	9
D3) Syllabus Summer 2012.....	12



A) COURSES OVERVIEW

The Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate, WS 2009/10

Level: Undergraduate

LANGUAGE: English.

Rule and Power [*Herrschaft und Macht*], SS 2010

Level: Undergraduate

LANGUAGE: German

Civil Obedience and Civil Disobedience, SS 2012

Level: Graduate

LANGUAGE: English

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B) TEACHING PHILOSOPHY

As philosophers, we like to devise elegant thought experiments to corroborate our views. Remarkably, however, we often forget to run a basic thought experiment, which would considerably help us become better teachers of philosophy: “If I were a student, how would I want this class to look like?” Unless we take this question seriously, there is little point in insisting that our classes are “student-centered”. Based on my experience as a student at Italian, German and American universities, I identified four core rules of thumb, which I think help live up to the expectations of our students. These four rules lie at the heart of my teaching philosophy:

Rule 1: *Nurture diverse interests.* I guess we all remember attending some classes at college mainly because they were mandatory, though we were not crazy about them. Situations of this kind depend partly on the breadth and depth of one’s interests. For instance, a student interested primarily in medieval metaphysics may not be particularly enthusiastic about a seminar on Rawls. Probably, though, the same student would be more eager to attend that course if part of the program were devoted to discussing – say – Rawls’s arguments about the status of metaphysics within political liberalism. My first rule of thumb is to write flexible syllabi, which specify some essential literature but also permit students to propose topics they would like to discuss, preferably toward the end of the seminar. The syllabi you see on my portfolio were in fact finalized after the first meetings, during which I surveyed students’ interests and tried to accommodate them as far as possible in the final schedule.

Rule 2: *Keep students busy during class.* Another way of attracting the attention of our students is to keep them as busy as possible during class. Consider how I normally introduce to students the prisoners’ dilemma. Instead of telling the (to us) all-too-familiar story of the two prisoners, I ask students to actually play a simple game I came up with, which puts them in the exact same situation as the famous prisoners. As far as I can tell, this general strategy proved quite effective, partly because interacting with students fits nicely with my ongoing, down-to-earth attitude. Only when my students (including the chronic yawners in the last row) show interest and somehow participate am I confident that my class may be truly “student-centered”.

Rule 3: *Be specific.* Students want and need to understand what we teach to them. As simple as that. So simple, though, that sometimes even seasoned teachers end up overlooking this crucial point. Specifically, teachers sometimes forget that even advanced students may have difficulties following (let alone fully appreciating) exceedingly abstract



arguments. For this reason, it is a good rule of thumb to start from concrete examples and be ready to come back to them whenever things get too abstract. For instance, during my first seminar I often referred to policy issues such as health care regulations and claims to minority rights to explain in which ways “liberal” and “communitarian” approaches to justice differ. With those examples at hand, students seemed to better understand the deeper theoretical disagreements between Rawls and his critics. Moreover, concrete examples concerning real-life situations tend to spark controversy among students, thus encouraging them to participate. On as much as three occasions, during my last seminar students kept discussing passionately on the limits of instrumental rationality and failed to notice that the class was over. I loved that.

Rule 4: Compare and contrast different philosophical views.

Monographic lectures which confine themselves to delving carefully into the subtleties of a single author are typically boring and unattractive. Students do not simply want to know what philosopher A says; they want to understand whether philosopher A is right. But to form a considered opinion of A’s philosophy, they need to know what other philosophers have objected to A. My last rule of thumb is to prompt student to develop a critical perspective by providing them with a comprehensive overview of different philosophical positions on the same topic. During my 2010 seminar, in which I presented competing conceptions of power, I relied heavily on this fourth rule of thumb, with positive results: students learned to defend the views they found more compelling against a broad spectrum of objections.

Of course, a teacher should like to get some hard proof of his/her accomplishments. This is the reason why (unlike most teachers in my department) I regularly conduct anonymous teaching evaluation surveys. Overall, the results I gathered thus far are positive. And although the reliability of surveys of this kind is often contested, I must say that I found the positive feedback I received very rewarding. Surely a teacher’s competence should not be inferred solely from student evaluations. To me, though, what matters most about those evaluations is the encouragement I get from them.



C) TEACHING EVALUATIONS SURVEYS

Teaching evaluation surveys

Complete summary

Tutor: Enrico Zoffoli, M.A.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “The Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate” • Winter 2009/10 • Undergraduate • 5 = strongly agree; 1 = strongly disagree 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Rule and Power” [<i>Herrschaft und Macht</i>] • Summer 2010 • Undergraduate • 5 = strongly agree; 1 = strongly disagree 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Civil Obedience and Civil Disobedience” • Summer 2012 • Graduate • 5 = strongly agree; 1 = strongly disagree
Mr Zoffoli was competent in the subject matter	5,00	4,60	4,67
Mr Zoffoli assigned reasonable and well-balanced reading loads	4,67	3,80	4,17
Mr Zoffoli encouraged participation	4,67	3,60	4,83
Mr Zoffoli explained concepts clearly	4,50	3,87	4,50
Mr Zoffoli answered questions well	4,83	4,07	4,50
Mr Zoffoli was receptive to answering questions outside class (e.g., via email)	4,67	4,60	4,67
Mr Zoffoli had personal qualities conducive to learning (e.g., good attitude, sense of humor, sincerity, friendliness)	4,83	4,40	4,50
Mr Zoffoli used blackboard and/or other visual aids effectively	4,00	3,27	4,33
Mr Zoffoli significantly contributed to my learning	4,83	3,73	4,17
Mr Zoffoli was overall effective	4,83	3,87	4,33



D) SYLLABI

D1) **The Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate, WS 2009/10**

Level: Undergraduate

TUTOR:

E. Zoffoli, M.A. (zoffoli@pg.tu-darmstadt.de)

LANGUAGE: English. NOTE: Although exams can be taken in German or English, the ability to read and understand English is a prerequisite.

CREDITS: 6

EXAMS: Presentation, term paper (for those who have not yet passed an exam with a *Hausarbeit*) or test (for those who have already passed an exam with a *Hausarbeit*). Oral exam is possible for certain undergraduate programs. Test date: 16. February. Term paper submission deadline: 31. March.

COURSE DESCRIPTION: At the center of the discussion between liberalism and communitarianism lies a central problem of political philosophy. How can a political theory be appropriate for a specific society and yet not be relativistic? How abstract may such a theory be and yet remain sufficiently concrete? Liberal approaches such as Rawls's "Justice as Fairness" aim to work out abstract principles of justice, which seek to remain neutral among competing ideas of the "good". According to Rawls, in taking up the point of view of the "original position" we are to conceive of ourselves as free and equal individuals who jointly agree upon and commit themselves to fair principles justice. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre, however, claim that Rawls's approach misunderstands the historical character of political contexts, in that it relies on an abstract conception of the person. During the course we will discuss the most significant communitarian reactions to Rawls's "A Theory of Justice" as well as some recent developments of the liberalism-communitarianism debate.

ROOM: S313/231

PROGRAM WITH DAY-BY-DAY LITERATURE:

(NOTE: all texts are available at: City Copies,
Holzstraße 5, 64283 Darmstadt.)

Oct. 27. Rawls: Justice as fairness

Rawls, J. (1999). *A Theory of Justice* (rev. ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA., 1999. pp. 3-15.

Nov. 3. Rawls: The original position



Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, pp. 118-130.

Nov. 10. Laying the basis for the communitarian critique

Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. (1996), *Liberals and Communitarians* (2nd Ed).
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 10-33.

Nov. 17. Sandel's communitarian critique: the liberal conception of the person

Mulhall / Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, pp. 40-50; Sandel, M.
(1982), *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (2nd Ed). Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 50-65.

Nov. 24. Rawls's reply to Sandel: a political conception of the person

Rawls, J. (2005) *Political Liberalism* (exp. ed.), pp. 22-43.

Dec. 1. MacIntyre's communitarian critique:

Mulhall / Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, pp. 70-71; 82-92; MacIntyre,
A. (1984), *After Virtue* (2nd Ed). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, pp. 244-255.

Dec. 8. Taylor's communitarian critique:

Mulhall / Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, pp. 102-113; Taylor, C.
(1992), *Sources of the Self – The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 75-90.

Dec. 15. A Rawlsian reply to MacIntyre and Taylor: a public conception of justice / Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, pp. 47-71.

Jan. 12. Walzer's communitarian critique: the relativity of social meanings / Mulhall / Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, pp. 127-132;

Walzer, M. (1983), *Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books, pp. 6-20.

Jan. 19. A Rawlsian reply to Walzer: abstraction and cultural particularity / Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, pp. 43-46; 178-190.

Jan. 26. Rawls the communitarian? 1 / Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, pp.

140-145; Habermas, J (1995). "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism", *Journal of Philosophy*, 92(3), pp. 119-122; Rawls, J. (1995) "Political Liberalism. Reply to Habermas", *Journal of Philosophy*, 92(3) pp. 142-149.

Feb. 2. Rawls the communitarian? 2 / Sangiovanni, A. (2008). "Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality", *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 16(2), pp. 137-164.

Feb. 9. Closing discussion.



FURTHER READING (optional):

- Forst, R. (1996). *Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit. Politische Philosophie jenseits von Liberalismus and Kommunitarismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Frazer, E. / Lacey, N. (1993). *The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Freeman, S.(ed.) (2003), *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Honneth, A. (ed.) (1993), *Kommunitarismus. Eine Debatte über die moralischen Grundlagen moderner Gesellschaften*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (1988). *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Miller, D. (1999). *Principles of Social Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Rasmussen, D. (1990). *Universalism vs. Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.



D2) Rule and Power [*Herrschaft und Macht*], SS 2010

Level: Undergraduate

TUTOR:

E. Zoffoli M.A. (zoffoli@pg.tu-darmstadt.de)

LANGUAGE: German

CREDITS: 6

EXAMS: Presentation, term paper (for those who have not yet passed an exam with a *Hausarbeit*) or test (for those who have already passed an exam with a *Hausarbeit*). Oral exam is possible for certain undergraduate programs. Test date: 28. July. Term paper submission deadline: 30. September.

SHORT COURSE DESCRIPTION (English): The concepts of “domination”, “power”, and “authority”, are widely employed in political philosophy; understanding them is crucial to understanding the thought of many important political philosophers. This course is devoted to exploring, from both a historical and a systematic perspective, the different meanings that thinkers such as M. Weber, H. Arendt, N. Luhmann, M. Foucault, J. Habermas, R. Dahl and S. Lukes have attached to the ideas of authority, domination and power.

FULL COURSE DESCRIPTION (German): Wenn man von Politik spricht, so spricht man auch immer von Macht: die Macht einer Parteivorsitzenden gegenüber einem einfachen Parteimitglied und die Macht der Parteimitglieder gegenüber ihrem Vorsitzenden, die Macht eines Staates gegenüber anderen oder die anonyme Macht des Marktes gegenüber den Akteuren. Genauso gibt es auch die Macht, gemeinsam als Gruppe ein Anliegen voranzutreiben und politisch zu handeln, die Macht eines überzeugenden Arguments oder die Macht über die Deutungshoheit in der öffentlichen Debatte. Anhand von Typen der besonderen Machtform Herrschaft unterscheiden wir verschiedene Regierungsformen wie Demokratie, Aristokratie oder Autokratie (gr. *kratein* = herrschen). Kurzum, Politik ist ohne den Kampf um Macht, ihre richtige Ausübung und ihre Legitimität nicht zu denken. In diesem in die Politische Theorie einführenden Seminar nähern wir uns den Schlüsselbegriffen Macht und Herrschaft über klassische und neuere Texte des 20. Jahrhunderts (u.a. Weber, Arendt, Dahl, Lukes, Foucault). Dabei wird über die zentrale Frage, was Macht und Herrschaft jeweils überhaupt sind die Grundlagen der Erschließung und Analyse theoretischer Argumente und Positionen erarbeitet.

ROOM: See program for details



PROGRAM WITH DAY-BY-DAY LITERATURE:

(NOTE: All texts are available for download; each seminar participant will receive a personal UserID and Password in due course)

Apr. 21 Introductory: overview of the course

Apr. 28. Power, domination, authority: some first thoughts / Göhler G. (2005): "Macht". In Gerhard Göhler / Mattias Iser / Ina Kerner (eds.): *Politische Theorie. 22 unkämpfte Begriffe zur Einführung*. Wiesbaden: VS, pp. 250-267.

May 6. Max Weber on *Macht, Herrschaft und Zwang*

Excerpts from Weber N. (1922): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*; Tübingen: Mohr 1972.

May 13: *No seminar meeting.*

May 20. Hannah Arendt: What is Power? What is Violence?

Arendt, H. (1970): *Macht und Gewalt*. Munich: Piper. Part II.

May 27. "Who governs?" – Robert Dahl

Dahl, R. A. (1957): The Concept of Power, *Behavioral Science* 2(3), pp. 201-215.

June 3: *No seminar meeting.*

June 10. Decisions and "non-decisions"– Bachrach Baratz

Bachrach P. / Baratz M. (1962): "Two Faces of Power", *The American Political Science Review*, 56(4), pp. 947-952.

June 17. Objective Interests?

Lukes S. (1974): *Power. A Radical View*. London: Macmillan.

June 24. Governmentality: Michel Foucault

Foucault M. (2000) [1978]: "Die Gouvernementalität". In: Ulrich Bröckling / Susanne Krasmann / Thomas Lemke (eds.): *Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. pp. 41-67.

July 1. Communicative power

Habermas, J. (1992), *Faktizität und Geltung – Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 166-187.



July 8. Luhmann on power

Luhmann N. (1975), *Macht*. Stuttgart: F. Enke Verlag, pp. 1-18.

July 15. Closing discussion

FURTHER READING (optional):

- Carter, I. (1999). *A Measure of Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Engelstad F. / Øyvind Ø. (eds.) (2004): *Power and Democracy. Critical Interventions*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Clegg S. R. / Haugaard M. (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of Power*. London: SAGE.
- Hirschmann, N. J. (2003). *The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Imusch P. (ed.) (1998): *Macht und Herrschaft. Sozialwissenschaftliche Konzeptionen und Theorien*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
- Lovett, F. (2010). *A General Theory of Domination and Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, D. (1983). "Constraints on Freedom", *Ethics*, 94, pp. 66–86.
- Wartenberg T. (ed.) (1992): *Rethinking Power*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.



D3) Civil Obedience and Civil Disobedience, SS 2012

Level: Graduate

TUTORS:

Dr. M. P. Ferretti (ferretti@pg.tu-darmstadt.de)

E. Zoffoli M.A. (zoffoli@pg.tu-darmstadt.de)

Dr. E. Ceva (Emanuela.ceva@unipv.it)

LANGUAGE: English

CREDITS: 3 to 8 (depending on master-program and type of exam)

EXAMS: Presentation (3 credits), term paper (3000-4000 words). Oral exam is possible in exceptional cases. Please make arrangements with the teachers about presentation, essay and exam. Essays should be sent as PDF attachments to ferretti@pg.tu-darmstadt.de by 30 September 2012 .

COURSE DESCRIPTION: Why do people *obey* the law? And under what conditions *should* they do that? According to proponents of theories of political obligation, even if disobedience may be justified in some cases, there is a presumption in favour of obedience to the laws of the state in which we live. However, more recently, even within the liberal tradition many theorists are sceptical about political obligation. Issues discussed in this seminar include: reasons for obeying or disobeying the law; justifications of political obligation; conscientious objection; varieties of civil disobedience; the use of civil disobedience in social change and protest movements.

ROOM: See program for details

PROGRAM WITH DAY-BY-DAY LITERATURE:

(NOTE: we will email all texts to seminar participants in due course)

1) Friday 20.4, Room: Seminar Room, Alexanderstrasse 35

11:45 – 13:15 (Zoffoli/Ferretti): **Overview of the program;** introduction to the relevant texts; information on credits and exams.

Text: Brownlee, K. (2012). Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience, in *The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Law*. Marmor, A. (ed.), Routledge.(Available at: <http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/about/themes/mancept/workingpapers/documents/Brownlee-ConscientiousObjectionandCivilDisobedience.pdf>)



2) **Friday 11.5, Room S215/409K**

13:00 – 14:45 (Zoffoli): **Is it rational to defect?**

Text: Gaus, G. (2011). *The Order of Public Reason – A Theory of Freedom in a Diverse and Bounded World*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 70-99.

15:15 – 17:00 (Ferretti): **Fair play and the provision of benefits.**

Text: Knowles, D. (2010). *Political Obligation. A Critical Introduction*, Milton Park: Routledge, Ch. 9, pp.130-144.

3) **Saturday 12. 5, Room S313/334**

10:00 – 11:45 (Ferretti) **Joint commitment and associative obligations.**

Text: Knowles, D. (2010). *Political Obligation. A Critical Introduction*, London: Routledge, Ch. 11, pp.171-189.

12:30 – 14:15 (Zoffoli) **Philosophical anarchism.**

Text: Horton, J (Ed.). 2010. *Political Obligation* (2nd Revised, updated and extended ed.). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Ch.5, pp. 109-133.

14:30 – 16:15 (Ferretti) **Why societies need dissent.**

Text: Sustain, C. (2003). *Why Societies Need Dissent*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp.14-39.

4) **Friday 18. 5 Room S215/409K**

13:00 – 14:45 (Ceva) **Conscientious objection.**

Texts: Raz, J. (1979). *The Authority of Law* Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 15, pp. 276-89; Galeotti, A. E. (2010). 'The Place of Conscientious Objection in a Liberal Democracy', in G. Calder, E. Ceva (eds), *Diversity in Europe. Dilemmas of Differential Treatment in Theory and Practice*, London: Routledge.

15:15 – 17:00 (Ceva) **Rules and exemptions.**

Texts: Barry, B. (2001). *Culture and Equality*, Oxford: Polity, pp. 308-28. Caney, S. (2002). 'Equal Treatment, Exceptions and Cultural Diversity', in P. Kelly (ed.), *Multiculturalism Reconsidered*, Oxford: Polity.

5) **Saturday 19. 5, Room S313/334**



10:00 – 11:45 (Ceva) **Varieties of civil disobedience.**

Texts: Rawls, J. (1971) *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.VI, pp. 363-91.

Dworkin, R. (1977). *Taking Rights Seriously*, London: Duckworth, Ch. 8, pp. 206-22

12:30 – 14:15 (Ceva) **The case of “Occupy”.**

Text: Interview with Joshua Cohen on a Rawlsian view of the ‘Occupy Wall Street Movement’: <http://occupytheairwaves.com/ep6> (An adapted transcript of the interview is available at:

http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/joshua_cohen_seth_resler_john_rawls_occupy_wall_street.php)

14:30 – 16:15 (Zoffoli) **Civil disobedience and critical theory.**

Text: Arendt, H (1972). “Civil Disobedience”, in *Crisis of the Republic*, New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, pp. 49-102.

16:30 – 18:15 (Zoffoli) **Recent protest movements in the Arab World.**

Text: Ottaway, M. and Hamzawy, A. *Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Available at:

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/OttawayHamzawy_Outlook_Jan11_ProtestMovements.pdf

FURTHER READING (optional)

- Brownlee K (2008). “Penalizing Public Disobedience”, *Ethics*, 118, pp. 711–16.
- Calder G. / Smith S. R. (2010). “Differential Treatment and Employability: A UK Case-Study of Veil-Wearing in Schools”, in G. Calder, E. Ceva (eds), *Diversity in Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Ceva E. (2011). “Self-legislation, Respect and the Reconciliation of Minority Claims”, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 28 (1), pp. 14–28.
- Del Bò C. (2012). “Conscientious Objection and the Morning-After Pill”, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, forthcoming (available at: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00559.x/abstract>).
- Green, T. H. (1895). *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*. London: Longmans, Green.
- La Follette E. / La Follette G. (2007). “Private conscience, public acts”, *Journal of Medical Ethics*, 33 (5), pp. 249–54.
- Lefkowitz, D. (2007). “On a moral right to civil disobedience”, *Ethics* 117, pp. 202–33.
- Ferretti M. P. (2009). “Exemptions for Whom? On the Relevant Focus of Egalitarian Concern”, *Res Publica*, 15 (3), pp. 269-90.